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I have noted in the *American Journal of Sociology* for January an interesting attempt to give the new conception of justice a form capable of legal use. The suggestion is to give the concept 'social debt' a legal as well as an ethical standing.

The philosophy of religion has been similarly affected. If the distinguishing mark of religion as contrasted with magic is found in the social relation between gods and people, we are in a position to interpret ancestor worship and similar facts in a way to show their ethical significance. The religious sanction of morality is seen to be rooted in intrinsic relations. The distinctive religious attitudes and sentiments may be analyzed and interpreted in a manner which supplements the classic interpretations of Kant, Schleiermacher and Hegel.

Of the social standpoint in esthetics I have written elsewhere.[2] Metaphysics might seem at first blush an unpromising field, but since Kant we have learned that reality, if known at all, must be known through categories; and if certain of these categories which give us a 'world of description' are themselves due to social influence, as Royce has maintained, the theory of knowledge is affected by the social standpoint in a fundamental manner. Accepting as in some sense true Kant's principle that the unity of self-consciousness is the ultimate principle of logic, we have still to ask how that demand for unity has been developed to the height found in the scientific mind. Assuming also with Kant that an irreversible sequence is the cue on the basis of which the mind interprets a connection as objective, we may yet seek additional factors in the consciousness of objectivity. The elements of objectivity in logical, ethical and esthetical judgments have their sources, in part at least, in the pressure of a social environment or the necessity of social communication.

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RECENT LITERATURE ON SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

FOR the reader who is not interested in the details of mediæval biography, bibliography and textual criticism, the most important articles on scholastic philosophy are those which discuss the scholastic system as a whole, or those which treat of some general phase or problem of scholasticism. The article by Professor Alfred H. Lloyd, of the University of Michigan, in the *International Journal of Ethics,* July, 1902, 'Scholars of the Cloister: a Defence,' is

[2] *Philosophical Review,* January, 1903.

a plea for a more intelligent appreciation of the schoolmen. The very least that can be said in favor of the study of scholastic philosophy is that it possesses that interest which all historically important events possess for the reflecting mind. Indeed, the conviction that all history is fundamentally one, that, although the accidentals have changed, the essentials of human development—the forces which make or mar human progress—are always the same, is one of the established principles of contemporary historical science. It may be said that there is no longer recognized a rigid line of demarcation between ancient, mediæval and modern. The problems, at least the most vital problems, of philosophy are always with us; and, while the circumstances in which they present themselves to us are new, the solution of them is, in our day, determined by the same helps and by the same obstacles which aided and hindered the work of the philosopher in ancient or in mediæval times. To this extent, at least, there exists a continuity between the speculation of the thirteenth century monk and that of the twentieth century philosopher; and the more we reflect the more apparent it becomes that the modern academic spirit is not so far from kinship with the spirit of the cloister as we commonly suppose. Even when we recognize that the modern spirit is less trammeled in its researches, we shall be forced to admit that it is to some extent hampered by the restrictions which arise from the cultivation of 'systems' and from loyalty to the traditions of 'schools.'

In an article entitled 'Scholastic and Mediæval Philosophy,' published in *Archiv. f. Gesch. der Phil.*, Bd. XV., Heft I, (1902), Dr. Lindsay gives a general survey of mediæval speculation, in which he rightly distinguishes between *scholasticism* and the various systems of anti-scholastic *mediæval* philosophy. One is inclined, however, to question many of his assertions, for instance, that 'scholasticism is less a system than a chaotic compound of all systems—a compound marked by a preference for judgment over facts, and for authority before reason.' The 'fides quærens intellectum,' as expressed in the more common formula 'Credo ut intelligam,' was, indeed, a phase of scholastic thought, and was represented in its highest form in the philosophy of St. Anselm; but there was another and an equally important phase of scholasticism, which found expression in the formula 'Intelligo ut credam'—a peculiar form of rationalism, represented in the initial stages of the movement by Roscelin and Abelard, and never wholly obliterated by the mysticism of their successors. It was the union of these two phases, the rational and the mystic, that constituted the special excellence of the scholasticism of the thirteenth century. Abelard no less than Anselm prepared the way for Albert and St. Thomas, and Dr. Lind-

say does less than justice to the author of 'Yea and Nay' when he writes that 'scholasticism, even in its early developments, was stoutly opposed by Abelard.' Dr. Lindsay is convinced that 'the modern contempt for scholasticism is exceedingly misplaced.' Is there ground for hoping that contempt will yield to intelligent appreciation so long as statements like the following from Dr. Lindsay's own article are accepted as accurate: 'Scholasticism is the doctrine of the church scientifically set forth'; 'Both Thomas and Duns Scotus held, each in his own way, to the doctrine of intelligible species, by which a copy of the object was supposed, in the process of knowledge, to arise and be seen by the soul'?

If scholasticism is all that its defenders claim that it is, why and how did it so quickly yield to modern modes of thought? Why did it fail to adapt itself to the scientific discoveries which ushered in the modern era? Dr. Lindsay truly says that 'the modern contempt for scholasticism has been an affectation inherited from the Renaissance.' But why should the Renaissance affect to despise scholasticism? The answer to these questions involves the study of the causes which led to the decay and dissolution of scholasticism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. To this study M. de Wulf, of the University of Louvain, devotes an article, 'La décadence de la scolastique à la fin du moyen âge,' in a recent number of *La Revue Néo-scolastique* (November, 1903). According to M. de Wulf, we should bear in mind that when we speak of the 'downfall' of scholasticism, there are certain reservations to be made, namely: (1) Although there was, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, a general revulsion of thought from the methods and conclusions of scholasticism, there flourished throughout that and the following centuries an important revival of scholasticism, especially in Spain and Portugal; (2) there never was a direct, and, so to speak, a single-handed encounter between mediæval philosophy and modern philosophy; the issue was complicated by a variety of circumstances, personal, social, political, religious, so that in the contest between mediæval and modern modes of thought philosophy was merely an incident. Scholasticism was worsted in its struggle with humanism, secularism, scientific discovery and religious revolt. When, therefore, Cartesianism entered the lists, it encountered there, not the vigorous scholasticism of the thirteenth century masters, but the decrepid and discredited philosophy of the later scholastics, who had foresworn the fundamental principles of their predecessors. This may seem like an attempt to defend scholasticism at the expense of the scholastics; yet, an examination of the condition of philosophy at the beginning of the fifteenth century will result in a confirmation of M. de Wulf's verdict. The style, severe, yet lucid,

of St. Thomas and his contemporaries had given place to the barbaric Latin of the Thomists and Scotists; the method of the schools was vitiated by a recrudescence of the 'dialectic madness' of the days of Abelard; an era of master-worship and 'ipse-dixitism' had been inaugurated; the fundamental scholastic doctrines of matter and form, intentional species, etc., had been distorted into the most fantastic theories; essence, potency and quality were adduced as sufficient explanations of all natural phenomena; so that it was easy for the humanist, keenly alive to the humor of the situation, to laugh away the last shred of respectability that hung to scholasticism. Molière's 'quia habet vim dormitivam' and similar jibes were only too well justified by the actual state of scholastic philosophy in the age immediately preceding the modern era. 'Summo otio abundantes, atque ingenio acres, lectione autem, impares' is Francis Bacon's description of the scholastics, as he knew them: men eager to know, yet unwilling to learn, too lazy to read, yet keenly intent on exercising their argumentative powers.

Similarly, in the contest with the representatives of the new science, there were on the side of the scientists enthusiasm, enlightenment, and not a little arrogance; on the side of the scholastics there were indolence, lack of information and, ever and always, the inclination to argue. Here M. de Wulf makes a distinction, on which he rightly insists, with little hope, however, of convincing those who are sceptical on the subject of the adaptability of scholasticism to modern conditions. There was, he maintains, no contradiction between the *essential* tenets of scholastic philosophy and the scientific discoveries of the new era. The contradiction, indeed, between the astronomy, physics, and chemistry of the new era and the scholastic doctrines regarding celestial and terrestrial matter he does not attempt to deny. He contends, however, that the schoolmen should have yielded these points as *non-essential;* they should have remembered that St. Thomas himself regarded the astronomical theories of the ancients as a hypothesis, not as a thesis, and that St. Bonaventure was prepared to admit that the earth may possibly not be the center of the universe; and if it is true that Melanchthon refused to look through a telescope, the scholastics should have recollected that they were the intellectual heirs of Aristotle, Albert and Roger Bacon, who, in their times, neglected not to avail themselves of every contrivance that was calculated to increase their knowledge of nature's laws. Instead of doing this, the scholastics clung to their ill-founded abstractions and inaccurate traditions, and, fearing that if a single stone were removed from the Aristotelian structure the whole edifice would crumble, they acted as if every assault on the physical system of the ancients were an attack on the most

vital doctrines of scholastic philosophy. The scientists were equally to blame inasmuch as they, too, failed to distinguish between the accidentals and the essentials of scholasticism, imagining that when they had disproved the physical doctrines of the schoolmen they had reason to reject also the psychology and the metaphysics of the schools. M. de Wulf concludes with a plea for a reconsideration of the sentence which the modern world has passed on scholasticism. The question is still debatable: neither the uncouth terminology, nor the false method, nor the maladroit tactics of its defenders should prejudice the case of scholastic philosophy, which in the persons of its neo-scholastic representatives pleads for a fair hearing.

The most noteworthy recent attempt to restore scholasticism, the movement inaugurated in the Catholic schools during the last quarter of the nineteenth century, receives attention at the hands of Professor Josiah Royce in an article entitled 'Pope Leo's Philosophical Movement and its Relation to Modern Thought,' published in the *Boston Evening Transcript* July 29, 1903, and republished in the *Review of Catholic Pedagogy,* December, 1903. Professor Royce has a singularly clear insight into the intent and purpose of a movement which is often misunderstood. He perceives that the aim of the originators of the movement was not so much to restore St. Thomas to his preeminence as the typical representative of scholasticism, as to secure for his original works a place too often taken by text-books which more or less unintelligently represented Catholic tradition and often misrepresented the doctrines of St. Thomas. He sees, too, that the purpose of the neo-scholastics is not merely to revive the study of the mediæval masters in their original texts, but also to bring the principles of scholasticism to bear on contemporary problems, to take cognizance of the ascertained results of modern scientific inquiry, to discard such tenets of scholasticism as have been proved to be false—in a word, to modify scholasticism by 'increasing and perfecting the old by means of the new.' As an 'outsider' he has no particular interest in gaining controversial victories over Catholics or in winning them to his own ideas; but he is interested in whatever tends to help them take part in the common intellectual life of the time. This, he thinks, the neo-scholastic movement is doing: it is bringing its adherents under the influence of the spirit as well as under that of the letter of St. Thomas's teaching; it has already resulted in a 'distinct increase of active cooperation on the part of Catholic scholars in the relatively neutral tasks of modern science and scholarship'; it has brought about a great increase in the understanding and appreciation of philosophers like Kant, whom it was formerly the fashion to dismiss with contempt; it has made for fairness, gentleness, thoroughness, and, therefore,

for scholarship. From this verdict of one who calls himself 'an outsider' few who view these matters from the inside will be inclined to dissent. M. de Wulf would certainly endorse everything Professor Royce has said; however, the Louvain professor would, probably, point out that what, according to the Harvard professor, the neo-scholastics have accomplished should have been the program of the scholastics of the fifteenth century. But what of the outlook for neo-scholasticism? Professor Royce emphasises, perhaps unduly emphasises, the modernization which scholasticism is certain to undergo at the hands of its latest exponents if the movement is allowed to continue unchecked. It seems to the present writer that at this point M. de Wulf would introduce his distinction between *essential* and *non-essential* and would insist that if the neo-scholastic movement is to make consistent progress it must hold to all the essential elements of the scholastic system, while modifying that system in points which are merely accidental.

During the years 1902 and 1903, the *Revue Néo-scolastique* published two articles by M. Meuffels and one by Count Domet de Vorges on the question, In what language shall scholastic philosophy be taught? The discussion is summed up in an article, 'The Language of the Schools,' in the current *Dublin Review* (January, 1904) by Rev. Francis Aveling. The question is mainly of pedagogical interest. There is, however, especially in the last-mentioned article, a discussion of the origin and growth of scholastic terminology which will be of interest to the general student of philosophy. The schoolmen did much towards fixing the meaning of many of our philosophical terms, and, however much we may deplore the time some of them lost in useless word-chopping, we must give them credit for their efforts in the matter of determining the exact meaning of technical words and phrases.

The influence of Arabian and Jewish speculation on the development of scholasticism in the thirteenth century is a question to which much attention is being directed at the present time. In the current number of the *Archiv. f. Gesch. der Philosophie* (Neue Folge, Bd. X., Heft 2; January, 1904), Dr. Pollak of Prague describes the general course of philosophical speculation among the Arabians in an article entitled 'Entwicklung der arabischen und jüdischen Philosophie im Mittelalter.' He calls attention to the various judgments passed on Arabian philosophy both as to its intrinsic value and as to its influence on Christian thought, and very strongly urges the consideration of the linguistic difficulties incident to the study of this philosophy. If we are to avoid the mistakes into which the first historians of Arabian philosophy were betrayed by their lack of philological knowledge, we must prepare the way for

a scholarly appreciation of Arabian and Jewish philosophy by comparing a whole set of Greek with the corresponding set of Syriac, Arabic and Hebrew terms, paying attention to the word-form as well as to the content, or meaning, of the word. We must not be satisfied with describing Arabian philosophy as 'Aristotelianism interpreted by the aid of neo-Platonic commentaries'; we must endeavor to ascertain how it synthesized these elements, how much it owes to Aristotle, how much to Plato and the Platonists, and how much to the speculative activity of the Arabian mind itself. The writer lays stress on this last factor, and by means of it explains the fact that, of all the Greeks, Aristotle came to be the favorite author among the Arabians, because his philosophy best suited the practical, empirical, tendency of the Arabian mind—apparently, the writer here overlooks the choice which the Syrian Nestorians and Jacobites, the first teachers of the Arabians, had already made in preferring Aristotle, 'the father of heresies,' as some of the Patristic writers call him, to Plato, the philosopher chosen by the orthodox Christians.

Developing this last point, the native element in Arabian philosophy, Dr. Pollak finds that even in Mahomet's day the Arabians were interested in the nature-study of the Syrian and Jewish scholars who dwelt among them as physicians and teachers. He traces the speculative efforts of the Motacallimin and Motazelites, who, even before the introduction of Greek philosophy, occupied themselves with the discussion of the philosophical aspects of the religious teaching of the Koran. Perhaps the most important point which he makes is his characterization of the translations which were made in the ninth century and continued down to the time of Avicenna and Averroes to be the versions officially recognized by Arabian scholars. These translations, besides being mere slavish, word-for-word, versions of the Syriac text, were dominated by the neo-Platonic ideas of the Syrian commentators, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Syrianus and Damascius. Even the greatest of the Arabian commentators on Aristotle accepted these versions—a fact which sufficiently explains the confusion surrounding the Averroistic interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine concerning the *νοῦς ποιητικός*.

After having traced the course of Arabian speculation through its various phases—purely theoretical interest, practical (religious) interest, scepticism, mysticism and return to Aristotle—Dr. Pollak concludes that, as we must not overestimate the intrinsic value of Arabian philosophy, so we must not underestimate its influence. That influence, he finds—especially the influence of the Arabian attempt to unite nature-study with philosophy—continued even

after the schoolmen had found in the Greek text an immediate source of knowledge of Aristotle's teachings, and appears not only in the writings of the last of the schoolmen, but also in those of the first representatives of the learning of the new era.

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DISCUSSION

THE STANDPOINT OF INSTRUMENTAL LOGIC

THE recent Logical Studies from the University of Chicago represent a somewhat notable contribution to American philosophy on several accounts. I wish here to consider the philosophical standpoint of the book from one side simply, in so far as it represents a protest against realism and ontology.

Briefly speaking, this standpoint makes, apparently, functional psychology supreme, for logic, and for philosophy in general. Thinking arises in a given psychological situation, and its relevancy is entirely limited to that situation. Thing and idea are reducible to the phases in this tensional experience which we call thinking, relative to one another, and to the situation in which they appear. Truth is to be put in terms wholly of the success which thinking has in leading up to a new experience, no longer torn by internal dissensions, but marked by immediacy of satisfaction. On the negative side, this denies outright any validity to the conception of an independent world of things to which thought points. The question of the relation of thought to reality in the traditional sense is entirely unmeaning. The material of our thought looks back to nothing save to the preceding experience out of which the difficulty that leads to thinking originates. The reference of thought is to nothing save the new integrating experience to which it leads. Objectivity is only a peculiar constitutive aspect attaching to a special stage of experience, at the period when experience is being reconstituted. The whole point of view represents a new positivism —not, of course, that the name condemns it—simplified by the abandonment as unmeaning of any unknown universe against which as a background human life is set.

It is not necessary to deny the relative value of this point of view. And the truth there is in it makes a polemic against the position more or less difficult to carry out. Every distinction that an objector may introduce can be shown to have a psychological genesis. And so if one simply sticks to the assumption that point-